World War One- deliberate plot or accident?

He shied away from responsibility - and provoked the First World War

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The de facto head of government of the Habsburg Empire, Leopold Count Berchtold, had come to office against his will.  His ultimatum to Serbia on 23 July 1914 was deliberately designed to be unacceptable.  The result was the Great War.

Of course, something had leaked out.  Actually, the official handover of the note from the Austro-Hungarian Empire and Kingdom to the Kingdom of Serbia was to take place at exactly 5 p.m. on 23 July 1914 - and trigger a political earthquake.  At least that was how Leopold Count Berchtold (1863-1942), the Foreign Minister (and de facto political head) of the Habsburg monarchy, had conceived it.

However, because the foreign ministries and embassies of the European powers had been working extremely intensely in the days prior to this and someone was always talking, well-informed journalists knew in outline what was coming.  So many newspapers in Europe speculated about the contents of the note that the Viennese court would shortly hand over.  What exactly would it say?  Almost four weeks had passed since the fatal Sarajevo assassination of heir to the throne, Franz Ferdinand on 28 June 1914, and still the Dual Monarchy had not published any investigative findings about the conspirators.

The "Münchner Neusten Nachrichten" expected rather moderate demands that "threaten neither the independence of Serbia nor its national dignity".  Many other German but also British and American papers took a similar view.  The Berlin "Vossische Zeitung", on the other hand, was less confident.  The national-liberal editorial board warned of the dangers of an ultimatum that was too strictly formulated.  It could drag not only Austria and Serbia, but also Russia into a war - and thus Germany and France.

Austrian newspapers came to the same conclusion.  However, this was less because of political foresight and more because they had better information than their Berlin colleagues.  The "Neue Zeitung" from Vienna correctly reported both on the deliberately short deadline for Serbia's reply to the note and on the actual goal of the Viennese government: it was a matter of the unrest in the Balkans "finally having to stop at all costs".  Apparently, the "Tagespost" from Linz relied on the same anonymous informant.

Their information proved to be accurate.  In fact, the demarche was formulated from the outset to be unacceptable.  In other words, it provided a reason for war.  This was Berchtold's calculation and Austria's chief diplomat had also communicated his plan in advance to the German Chancellor, Theobald von Bethmann Hollweg: "Count Berchtold let slip the hope that Serbia would not accept Austria-Hungary's demand, since a mere diplomatic success would again trigger a slack mood in this country, which was absolutely not needed."

Due to the press reports, Belgrade knew what was about to happen when Austria's envoy, Vladimir Freiherr Giesl von Gieslingen, asked at short notice for an official meeting at the Serbian Foreign Ministry at around 5 p.m. that Thursday.  When the request to postpone the appointment by one hour followed a little later, the explosive nature of the situation became completely clear.

The "demarche" was indeed sharply worded.  The Serbian government was to publish without reservation a condemnation of the “Greater Serbian” propaganda in a formulation written by Vienna and undertake to act in future "with the utmost severity" against persons who agitated against the Habsburg monarchy.

But the real imposition was yet to come, in ten points that Belgrade was also to accept in full: The Serbian military had to be cleansed of supporters of the “Greater Serbian” ideology, and all smuggling into Bosnia had to be stopped by all means.

Absolutely unacceptable, however, was priority Point Five: The Serbian government had to agree "that organs of the Imperial and Royal government are allowed to be active in Serbia in the suppression of the subversive movement directed against the territorial integrity of the monarchy".

In plain language this meant: Serbia was to give up its sovereignty, to surrender itself completely to the grip of the Viennese authorities.  This was surprising, in spite of the leaked information, because no one who strives for agreement actually makes such unrealisable demands.  But that is precisely what Austria-Hungary did not want.

Was Leopold von Berchtold a warmonger?  Did he deliberately seek to escalate the regional conflict into a world war?  Born in Vienna in 1863 as the son of very wealthy aristocrats, he had studied law and political science and then entered the diplomatic service of the Dual Monarchy.

A consistent career followed: From 1894, he worked at the Embassy in Paris, in 1897 as First Secretary (third in rank) at Austria's representation in London, in 1903 as Embassy Councillor(second in rank) in St. Petersburg and rose to be Ambassador there at the end of 1906.  In 1908, he prepared the agreement with the Tsar's court that led to the annexation of Bosnia by the Habsburg monarchy - and to a sharp confrontation of pan-Slavist circles against Austria-Hungary.

In 1912, Berchtold rose to the position of "Minister of the Imperial and Royal Household and of Foreign Affairs" of Austria-Hungary.  Due to the special construction of the dual monarchy, with one Minister-President each for the Austrian ("Cisleithanian") and the Hungarian ("Transleithanian") parts of the Empire, but joint ministers for foreign affairs, war and finance, this function meant he was the actual political head.  The Foreign Minister also chaired the Council of Ministers for Common Affairs of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, which, in addition to the three joint ministers, included the two Prime Ministers and the Chief of General Staff.

In his new function, Berchtold set his sights on confrontation with Serbia but at the same time strove for "normalisation" with Russia.  This was an ambivalent attitude, similar to that of the political leaderships in Paris, Berlin and St. Petersburg, as well as - to a lesser extent due to worldwide commitments - in London.

In the July crisis of 1914, Berchtold's ultimatum acted as an accelerant that within little more than a week led to a European World War and, because of the perceived lack of alternatives on the German side, to the so-called Schlieffen Plan. Two weeks after 23 July, fierce fighting raged in both the west and east of the Central Powers, Germany and Austria-Hungary.

Leopold von Berchtold remained Foreign Minister in Vienna and de facto head of government until mid-February 1915.  Then he moved to the side of the heir to the throne, Archduke Karl, as an advisor.  He served him until Karl’s abdication in 1918 and as far as possible beyond.  There followed a few years in exile in Switzerland before Berchtold moved to his estates there in 1923 under the protection of the Hungarian dictator, Miklós Horthy and died unnoticed by the public during the next World War in 1942.

"A rich and not untalented aristocrat had been chosen for a relatively short stretch of his life to a position he was not equal to," was the historian Johann Albrecht von Reiswitz's verdict on Berchtold in 1955 . A harsh judgement, but one that Christopher Clark, author of the book, “The Sleepwalkers” shared in 2013 in a slightly softened form: "The reluctance that he made no secret of when he was offered posts of higher rank and with more responsibility was undoubtedly genuine."