What is wrong with Putin's tanks? The T-72, Putin's Steel Coffin

Source

The T-72 was designed as a fast attack tank for large engagements.  Hundreds have been destroyed in Ukraine where the workhorse of the Russian armed forces has been used as target practice.

Much has been said about the T-14 Armata but Putin's super tank is still not in action. The T-90 was also frequently presented in its modernized variants.  But the standard tank of the Russian armed forces is much older being a modernized variant of the T-72.

T-14

T-90

A tank built in large numbers since the early 1970s.  The T-72 is the most-produced main battle tank of the present.

T-72 Before

T-72 After

Peculiarities of tank building of the USSR

At that time, it has several peculiarities.  The T-72 was developed in the late 1960s to accommodate a 125mm calibre tank gun.  The Bundeswehr's standard battle tank at the time, the Leopard 1, only had a calibre of 105 mm.

Another peculiarity of Soviet tank construction is the crew of only three men.  One man less reduces the interior space to be protected.  Since the T-64, the Soviets have incorporated an automatic machine to save on an extra crew member as the loader.  In the T-72, the propellant charge and projectile are held in separate carousel magazines and brought into the chamber fully automatically.  The complicated mechanics are said to have never caused any technical problems.  Also typical for the tank construction of the USSR is the weight of under 50 tons and the flat silhouette.  For comparison: the Leopard II weighs well over 60 tons.  With additional fuel tanks, the T-72 achieves a range of 550 kilometres.

Over time, the T-72 has undergone several modernizations.  But now in the Ukraine war, its weaknesses are showing.  This includes, above all, the magazine below the turret.  The crew sits on the ammunition store.  A hit in this area causes a massive internal explosion, often blowing off the entire tower.  Other tanks attempt to mitigate this threat by storing ammo in sealed boxes at the rear of the tank.

Wrong use of the tanks

However, the high losses in the Ukraine war - Russia is said to have lost over 300 T-72s - are less due to the specific design of the T-72.  At the beginning of the war, many tanks were lost due to incorrect operational doctrine.  There were also logistical problems.  In the event of technical problems, the tanks had to be abandoned because no recovery and repair units were available.

The war in the Ukraine also shows that battle tanks are tough opponents.  These include infantry anti-tank weapons, of which Kyiv has received in large numbers from the West.  These include advanced systems like the Javelin, which can fly over a tank and penetrate the barely protected topside.

But simpler and more reliable systems than the Javelin have destroyed the main battle tanks. In particular, the reactive armour, which is supposed to blast off the warhead of an anti-tank missile, has not met expectations.

In addition, all common battle tanks are designed as tanks for duelling with other tanks and have their best protection at the front. In the Ukraine war, however, the tanks are now being attacked by fighter squads from hidden positions.  They target the weaker armoured sides and undercarriage.

For this purpose, the main battle tanks are attacked by drones from the air.  However, most of the losses are due to targeted artillery strikes.  Scouts or drones spot the enemy vehicles and shortly thereafter the artillery fires at them.  Another point is the heavy use of anti-tank mines.

New opponents for the main battle tank

The T-72 is comparatively defenceless against these opponents.  However, it can be assumed that other main battle tanks would have similar problems.  The explosions might not be as spectacular, but a side-penetrating hit from a Panzerfaust 3 would likely kill the crew of a Leopard II as well.  Only hard-kill systems could offer a remedy.  The shooting down an incoming missile is attempted.  They are not a panacea.  Hard-kill systems cannot do anything against airstrikes, artillery and mines.  When a Panzerfaust is used at close range, they reach their limits.  Modern anti-tank weapons send two projectiles on their way at the same time.  The first is a dummy, which attracts the defence and protects the second which finds its target.

Ultimately, the high losses are only secondary to the structural weaknesses, primarily the wrong operational doctrine is responsible.  It remains unclear whether there is any doctrine that promises success in a war like the one in Ukraine.  Kyiv has not learned from the course of the war so far that main battle tanks are generally obsolete.  The country is trying to get as many battle tanks as possible.