Germany- the military vacuum at the heart of Europe

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A lot of money is not enough: Germany will remain a military vacuum in the middle of Europe even after the "change of the era".

The Bundeswehr receives an additional 100 billion euros but this is only enough for a minimal restoration of the German army. The ground forces will hardly be strengthened.  Germany is far from building the "most powerful army in Europe".

The additional 100 billion euros will only be used to close gaps in the Bundeswehr that have long been recognised.

The mission was comprehensive, time was short and the number of soldiers too small: the first mechanised advance of German troops since the Second World War was a Herculean task.  Brigadier General Fritz von Korff entered Kosovo from the South on 12 June 1999.  On the one hand, he was to ensure the withdrawal of the Serbian units in the Prizren area and, on the other hand, he was to immediately ensure a minimum of security in his sector.

Von Korff was under enormous pressure to succeed.  Despite an agreement between the Serbian generals and Nato, fighting could have broken out at any time.  The situation was confusing and partly chaotic.  While refugees poured back into the country, others had to leave their homes. The conventional part of the operation, the co-ordination of armoured units and a tactical air landing, succeeded pretty much according to plan for von Korff and his battalion commanders.

The stabilisation of the city of Prizren and its surroundings, however, turned out to be more difficult than expected, as a Dutch study points out.  First, the schedule got out of hand, then there were not enough forces to be everywhere at once.  As the Kosovo mission progressed, the heavy armament proved to be more of a disadvantage.  What was needed was a re-inforced police force, comparable to the gendarmerie in France or the carabinieri in Italy. The soldiers, who were primarily trained for combat missions had to take on protective tasks.

Disarmament beyond the pain threshold

Commencing with the mission in Kosovo, the Bundeswehr began a gradual transformation.  The primary mission, national defence and the robust part of the alliance obligation for NATO, receded into the background.  The German armed forces were tasked with foreign missions, accentuated after the attacks of 11 September 2001: the USA needed its allies for the "war on terror".  The German armed forces shifted their centre of strength to Afghanistan.

Until the withdrawal from Kabul a year ago, the main focus was on the fight against insurgents.  A war against an equal opponent in Europe became a theoretical figure from the distant past when in training.

The military craft that von Korff had mastered in his sleep during his advance to Prizren has meanwhile withered away.  The Bundeswehr has reduced its hard core beyond the pain threshold. The German ground forces now have only two large units that in name have something to do with war: Of the once six German armoured divisions of Army Structure 4 during the Cold War, only the First and Tenth Armoured Divisions remain.

The divisional names are taken from the tradition of the Bundeswehr.  However, in reality, the designation of the two large units is a misnomer.  The battle tanks, the hard currency of the ground troops, have been cut down to such an extent that they almost have rarity value within the two German armoured divisions.  The German army lacks the combat power to hold its own in a conventional war.  Only with strong armoured units can an attacker on the ground really be driven away.

Even the battle tanks that the army should have are not all operational at present: There is a considerable gap between the target and the actual inventory. The situation is likely to be similar with other weapons systems such as artillery: Horror stories about military lottery operations abound but hard facts are scarce.  The Federal Ministry of Defence keeps the specific figures under wraps.  The weakness of the Bundeswehr should not be rubbed in the faces of NATO's opponents.

The NZZ has therefore put the battle tanks to the test.  The starting point is the "order of battle" of the two tank divisions.  This tactical organisation chart can be traced on the Bundeswehr homepage.  From this it becomes clear how far German disarmament has really gone.  To this end, it was possible to obtain a confidential paper showing the current stocks of Leopard 2 battle tanks.  Of course, modern armed forces function in concert.  The focus on main battle tanks, however, illustrates the fundamental malaise.

A quarter of Leopard 2 main battle tanks too few?

Within the two tank divisions mentioned above, the Bundeswehr still has five active tank battalions.  One of these is a Dutch-German mixed unit.  There are two more battalions in the organisation chart, but Mountain Tank Battalion 8 is a reserve unit.  An additional battalion is designated as the "Panzerlehrbataillon" (tank training battalion).

To equip all units, the Bundeswehr needs 264 Leopard 2 tanks.

Tank units of the 1st and 10th Panzer Divisions

The main combat vehicle of the German tank units is the Leopard 2 main battle tank, of which each battalion has 44.  Deviations in numbers are possible but can be neglected for the overall picture of the operational capability of the German Leopard fleet.

If only the five active tank battalions are taken into account, there is a target inventory of 220 Leopard 2s.  In addition, there are at least 44 more main battle tanks required for training.  Moreover, the Tank Training Battalion 93 can also be sent into action.  According to this calculation, the Bundeswehr needs a minimum of 264 Leopard 2s to ensure that all units are fully equipped.

But even the disarmed army is currently lacking operational tanks: a current, internally classified document available to the NZZ lists the number of Leopard tanks in the Bundeswehr in detail:

Aktive Leopard-2-Kampfpanzer der Bundeswehr

Type A7V (equipped for combat in built-up areas): 53

Type A6 (programme "maintaining operational readiness"): 110

Type A6M (special mine protection): 30

Under reconstruction: 99 (44 A6, 20 A6M, 18 A7, 17 A7V)

Type A5 for target display: 19

Relevant for the tank battalions are the types A7V, A6M and A6.  According to this overview, the Bundeswehr has 193 of these as of May this year.  This means that about a quarter of the minimum 264 Leopard tanks needed are currently missing.  If the 99 tanks that are currently being converted are added later, the Bundeswehr will again reach the target number.  With the Leopard tanks, the German army is thus trying to get rid of the image of a paper army.

The Bundeswehr does not currently have the tanks it needs to equip its troops.

Target and actual Leopard 2 inventory

By way of comparison, the Swiss Army, which has also been stripped to the bare bones, has 134 Leopard 2s in service today that have undergone a refit to "maintain their value".  In addition, 96 more Leopard 2s are stored in a warehouse as a reserve, with which at least two more tank battalions could be equipped if necessary.  Switzerland's starting position for the reconstruction of its army is thus much more comfortable than in neighbouring Germany, which is ten times larger.

"The Bundeswehr is more or less bare"

The Bundeswehr's need to catch up is enormous: three days after Russia's invasion of Ukraine, German Chancellor Olaf Scholz proclaimed a "change of era" in the Bundestag on 27 February.  With a "special fund" of 100 billion euros, the Bundeswehr was to be expanded in a few years to become the most powerful conventional force in Europe.  The goal was a powerful, highly modern and progressive Bundeswehr, as was appropriate "for a country of our size and importance in Europe".

Three days earlier, the Inspector of the Army, Alfons Mais, had already vented his anger.  On his Linkedin page, the lieutenant general wrote: "In my 41st year of service in peace, I would not have believed that I would have to experience another war.  And the Bundeswehr, the army I am allowed to lead, is more or less bare." Even eight years after the annexation of Crimea, Mais said, Germany had not drawn the consequences and invested in its own defence readiness.  This oath of revelation by the highest-ranking soldier in the German army caused internal anger but was a spur to action for politicians.

According to a 2017 German Army thesis paper, the level of ambition is clear: "Taking, holding, controlling and commanding space remain as core requirements for land forces."

Overnight, the Ministry of Defence climbed back into the top political league.  Only months earlier, the coalition government had appointed an embarrassing minister without in-depth military expertise: Christine Lambrecht, a lawyer and specialist in legal policy issues, is to transform the Bundeswehr into a serious army again.

Mais and Lambrecht

In terms of content, the Minister can fall back on solid foundations laid by her predecessors.  Back in 2016, the Federal Government issued a White Paper on the future of German security policy.  The deliberations were influenced by Russia's annexation of Crimea, which violated international law.  The essence of the White Paper is almost lost amidst all the abstract concepts: Germany must finally assume its military responsibility at the centre of Europe.

Stringent priorities of the economic plan

A year later, the German Army published a thesis paper entitled "How will land forces fight in the future?".  In it, the main trends that are shaping the course of the war in Ukraine today are pointed out with remarkable clarity.  For example, it points to the Russian tactic of the rolling barrage,  that is the massive use of artillery to wear down the enemy.  This is exactly how the Kremlin's troops are now trying to wrest important terrain from the Ukrainian army in the Donbass.

Further, "faster decision and engagement cycles" are cited as key challenges for land forces.  The time between reporting a possible target, deciding to engage it and using a weapon has been significantly shortened with the digitalisation of command and control systems. This is also evident in the current war: technological progress enables the Ukrainian army to deploy its forces much more agilely than the Russian attackers can with their command and control via voice radio.

The digital upgrade of the "sensor-guidance-action network" is therefore a central issue in the modernisation of the Bundeswehr.  This is shown by the priorities in the 2022 economic plan for the special fund of 100 billion euros that Scholz announced in his speech on the change of era.  More money is being spent on procurement in the "command capability / digitalisation dimension" than on the renewal of the ground forces.  To put it somewhat casually: instead of additional battle tanks, military tablet computers will be purchased.

The weighting of the individual budget items in the economic plan of the Special Fund consistently follows the concept of the Bundeswehr in 2018.  This third basic paper, a kind of umbrella philosophy, focused on developing capabilities to operate in a network.

Use of the Bundeswehr Special Fund

20.7 billion for the command capability/digitalisation dimension.  This includes a network of computer centres, modern radio equipment, satellite communication and a tactical information network for ground troops.

1.9 billion for clothing and personal equipment.  Mention is made of the "Infantryman of the Future" soldier system so that German soldiers meet the standard of the NATO High Readiness Task Force.

16.6 billion for ground troops.  The Puma infantry fighting vehicles are heavyweights. The Main Ground Combat System is also listed.  This Franco-German project is to replace the Leopard 2 from 2035.  Here, too, the focus is on networking.  However, development is not progressing.

8.8 billion for the Navy.

33.4 billion for the Air Force.  The most striking project is the procurement of the F-35 as a Tornado replacement for participation in the nuclear deterrent.  The American fifth-generation jet is likely to become the new standard in Germany as in other European countries.  The F-35 is a flying data magnet that plays a central role in the sensor-command-effect network.

0.4 billion euros for research and technology, including surveillance and securing large spaces using artificial intelligence.  The lack of mass in man and material is to be compensated by technical superiority.

With the technology boost, the Bundeswehr will be able to contribute its capabilities to the NATO alliance more effectively than before.  However, the physical combat power of the ground forces in particular will not be significantly increased.

Too little strength to fight independently

Already after the annexation of Crimea in 2014, a "turnaround" was announced.  The Ministry of Defence envisaged an investment requirement of 130 billion euros for the period from 2016 to 2030.  Obviously, however, it was not until the Russian attack on Ukraine that words were followed by deeds.

With the Special Fund "outside the regular defence budget", the operational readiness of the Bundeswehr is now to be increased quickly.  Or to put it another way: the long-recognised need for investment is now actually being financed.

However, in order for Germany to really have "the most powerful army in Europe", it will need more than the 100 billion of the Special Fund.  At the beginning of June, the Bundestag's Commissioner for the Armed Forces, Eva Högl, said it plainly in an interview: "The Bundeswehr's needs go far beyond the Special Fund."

The actual level of ambition for ground forces is written in the Army's 2017 thesis paper: "Taking, holding, controlling and dominating space remain as core requirements for land forces." What this means against an opponent like the Russian army is proven by the course of the war in Ukraine: Kyiv can hold territories and regain small pieces of terrain.  But in order to really take the initiative, the Ukrainian army is dependent on modern, heavy weapons from the West, not to mention sufficient supplies of fuel and ammunition.

According to the budget, the Special Fund provides 1.93 billion euros for clothing and personal equipment for the soldiers.

In view of the German Army's "Order of Battle", however, there is reason to doubt what combat performance the German ground forces can really achieve on their own.  Even a Bundeswehr equipped with a lot of money is unlikely to be able to retake larger areas with counter-attacks and decisively defeat an opponent.  Five active tank battalions are not enough for this.

It is also questionable whether there are really enough tank shells for the nearly 300 German Leopard tanks that will be deployed in the future.  In a speech, Defence Minister Lambrecht said that the Bundeswehr lacks ammunition worth 20 billion euros.  A second indication: Ukraine only receives three German Mars missile launchers.  The necessary missiles are missing.  In a real mission, the German combat troops would probably have to cease fire after a short time.

Of course, the Bundeswehr is not alone but integrated into NATO structures.  However, until recently, it could not even fulfil its NATO Alliance obligation, as the episode of the "broomstick army" from September 2014 shows.  During the NATO exercise "Noble Ledger" in Norway, German soldiers mounted broomsticks painted black on their armoured vehicles to compensate for the problem of missing gun barrels.

In an interview at the beginning of 2015, former NATO General Harald Kujat spoke of a situation that could not be surpassed in terms of embarrassment.  Kujat is one of the founding fathers of the Nato Response Force (NRF), a reaction force that is supposed to be ready to march particularly quickly in the event of war.  At that time, "Noble Ledger" prepared the troops for their tasks as NRF.  It is precisely this element that NATO now wants to increase to 300,000 soldiers, as the allies decided at their summit meeting in Madrid.

The Bundeswehr will thus be called upon even more than before.  The ground forces must be able to provide troops, material and ammunition for the following NATO formats.

A tank battalion is to be deployed as the core of a multi-national combat force in Lithuania (Enhanced Forward Presence).

At least one brigade is to stand by in enhanced readiness for the NATO Response Force.

Another brigade is preparing to complement the NRF's Very High Readiness Joint Task Force.

In the short term, Germany wants to be able to provide a division for the alliance commitment by 2025, as the Ministry of Defence has promised in various papers since 2016.  With the existing forces plus the special assets, this should work.  The all arms battle, as practised by Brigadier General von Korff in his advance, will once again become the core business of the Bundeswehr.  High on the list are the German Leopards.  The five German tank battalions are in for a tough time.

The Army's robust forces are thus tied up in Eastern Europe for the time being.  The Bundeswehr can either fulfil its NATO Alliance obligation or be used for national defence.  Both together are not possible.  Even if another division is established by 2031 in addition to the 1st and 10th Armoured Divisions, Germany will not be able to defend itself independently.

Initially, this may not frighten anyone in the logic of the alliance.  Defence is a joint task in NATO. Germany, a fully sovereign state again since 1990, continues to rely on the strong presence of US troops.  However, this is not set in stone.  Under President Donald Trump, the American taxpayer's commitment to German security was being openly questioned.

But regardless of manpower, material and ammunition: even if Germany can make up for the procurement shortfall, this will not change the tense relationship between the Bundeswehr and the population.  In a democratic state, the real focus of military power lies with the citizens.  Without their support, neither billions of euros nor the most modern technology will help.

Thus, von Korff's true merit in the Kosovo mission of 1999 was hardly honoured in Germany.  Despite chaotic conditions, he managed to save the minorities of a multi-ethnic city from expulsion in his area thanks to clever preparation.  What would be needed is a healthy measure of public respect for military achievement - whether in Afghanistan, the Western Balkans or now in the Baltic States.